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OFFENSIVE SPEECH AND THE PENNSYLVANIA
DISORDERLY CONDUCT STATUTE
by THOMAS M. PLACE*
INTRODUCTION
The issue of public civility, the state's interest in preventing acts of
violence, and the right of free speech have been the subject of a number of
recent Pennsylvania Supreme' and Superior Court 2 decisions. The decisions
concern prosecutions under the disorderly conduct statute3 for directing
offensive words to police officers and others in public places. The issue of
whether the punishment of such speech as disorderly conduct violates the
First Amendment first came before the Pennsylvania courts in the 1980s. In
affirming convictions' 4 for the public use of offensive speech under the
"unreasonable noise" and "obscene"' language sections of the statute, the
appellate courts rejected constitutional challenges to the disorderly conduct
statute on vagueness and overbreadth grounds in holding that the statute
applied only to speech unprotected by the First Amendment. The courts
further held that even if the offensive words the speaker used were not
technically "obscene," the words were nonetheless punishable under the
6
statute because they "inflict injury" by their very utterance.
In recent Supreme and Superior Court decisions concerning the use of

* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University. I
would like to thank Grace D'Alo for comments on earlier drafts. Additional thanks are due to
Aaron Riesmeyer for research assistance.
1. Commonwealth v. Hock, 720 A.2d 943 (Pa. 1999).
2. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2000); Commonwealth v. Bryner, 652
A.2d 909 (Pa. Super. 1995); Commonwealth v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. 2000).
3. 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5503 (West 2000). The relevant portion of the statute provides:
§ 5503. Disorderly conduct (a) Offense defined.- A person is guilty of disorderly
conduct if, with intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or
recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (1) engages in fighting or threatening, or in
violent or tumultuous behavior; (2) makes unreasonable noise; (3) uses obscene
language, or makes an obscene gesture; or (4) creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
Each year, there are more arrests in Pennsylvania for disorderly conduct than
Pennsylvania State Police Bureau of Research and
any other offense.
Development, Uniform Crime Report of Pennsylvania, 80-82, A-13 (1998).
4. Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54 (1980), appeal dismissed, Mastrangelo v.
Pennsylvania,449 U.S. 894 (1980).
5. Commonwealth v. Pringle,450 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa. Super. 1982). The author was counsel
for the defendant in Pringle.
6. Id. at 107.
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offensive language, both courts, in contrast to their earlier holdings, reversed
convictions for disorderly conduct either because the offensive words used
were not "obscene ' 7 as defined by the United States Supreme Court in Miller

v. California,8 or because they were directed at a police officer outside the
hearing of others and there was no risk that the officer would respond in a
violent manner.9

While not overruling earlier decisions, recent disorderly

conduct opinions significantly limit the circumstances in which the public use
of offensive speech is punishable as disorderly conduct.
To assess the impact of the recent decisions and, more specifically, to

determine when Pennsylvania courts can punish offensive speech as
disorderly conduct consistent with the First Amendment, this article begins
by reviewing United States Supreme Court decisions concerning offensive
speech and the "fighting words" exception to the First Amendment. Part I
briefly reviews the development of the "fighting words" doctrine as originally
articulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire"° and as redefined by the Court

in subsequent decisions."

In addition, this Part reviews Supreme Court

decisions holding that speech does not lose its protection under the First
Amendment because it annoys or offends the sensibilities of listeners. 12 The
article notes that although the "fighting words" doctrine today is less
expansive than originally set out in Chaplinsky, prosecutions based upon

offensive speech have been upheld where the breach of peace or disorderly
conduct statute has been narrowly limited to apply only to speech that meets
3
the Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky definition of "fighting words."'

7. Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1288 (holding that words and conduct used were disrespectful,
insulting and offensive, but not obscene within the meaning of the statute); Bryner, 652 A.2d at
912 (holding that words shouted in a public place, though provocative and annoying, were not
obscene within the meaning of the disorderly conduct statute).
8. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). In Miller, the court held that the "basic guidelines" for
determining whether material is obscene and therefore outside the protection of the First
Amendment are
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a potentially offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. (citations omitted).
9. Hock, 728 A.2d at 947 (holding defendant's profane remark to police officer as she was
walking away was not disorderly conduct).
10. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
11. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (holding Georgia statute prohibiting
opprobrious words or abusive language tending to cause a breach of peace directed to or used in
the presence of another unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because it was not limited to
"fighting words" defined by Chaplinsky); Cohen v. California,403 U.S. at 26) (holding that a
statute may not make the simple display of a single four letter expletive a criminal offense
without a compelling reason).
12. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) (overturning defendant's conviction because it
may have been based solely on his own words or both his words and his deeds); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (reversing defendant's conviction under a city ordinance that
permitted conviction if defendant's speech "stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or
brought about a condition of unrest").
13. See e.g. State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me. 1980); People v. Chatfield, 372 N.W.2d 611
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Part II begins by discussing the Pennsylvania disorderly conduct
statute.' 4 It notes that while the statute is based upon the Model Penal
Code, 5 the legislature did not adopt the language of the Code that
specifically addresses the use of offensive speech.16 The section then
discusses how the Pennsylvania courts have considered offensive speech in
the context of applying the disorderly conduct statute. More specifically,
Part II examines decisions from the 1980s in which the courts purported to
limit the statute to "fighting words."' 7 This section argues that the
Pennsylvania courts failed to authoritatively construe the statute in a manner
consistent with the Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky "fighting words"
decisions. 18 Part II also analyzes recent decisions reviewing disorderly
conduct convictions involving offensive speech under the "obscene"
language, 19 "unreasonable noise" 20 and "fighting and threatening"'z
provisions of the statute. Part II concludes that the Pennsylvania courts have
limited the disorderly conduct statute by rejecting "fighting words" as a basis
for punishing personally insulting speech directed at the police outside the
hearing of others. 22 In addition, Superior Court decisions have construed the
statute's prohibition on the use of "obscene" speech in such a manner so as
23
to effectively end the use of this provision as a means to punish such speech.
Part III discusses the provisions of the statute that prohibit "fighting and
threatening '24 and making an "unreasonable noise. 2 5 This section contends
that both provisions remain unconstitutionally vague as applied to offensive
(Mich. App. 1985); In the Matter of the Welfare of S.L.J., 263 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. 1978); Billings
v. Batten, 705 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1985).
14. 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5503 (West 2000). See supra, n. 3 for text of statute.
15. Model Penal Code § 250.2 (ALI 1962). The relevant section of the statute provides:
(1) Offense Defined. A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if, with purpose to cause
public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: (a)
engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; or (b) makes
unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display, or addresses
abusive language to any person present; or (c) creates a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
16. Model Penal Code § 250.2(b) (ALl 1962). See supra,n. 15 for relevant text of statute.
17. Pringle, 450 A.2d at 107 ("Even if the words in issue would not be considered obscene,
they certainly constituted 'fighting words'...."); Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d at 58 ("It is clear in the
instant case that appellant was not exercising any constitutionally protected right; rather, in a
loud, boisterous and disorderly fashion, he blurted epithets at the meter maid which we believe
fit the Chaplinsky definition of fighting words.").
18. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
19. U.S. v. McDermott,971 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Brockway v. Shepherd,942 F. Supp.
1012 (M.D. Pa. 1996); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2000); Bryner, 652
A.2d at 912.
20. Commonwealth v. Gilbert,674 A.2d 284 (Pa. Super. 1996); Commonwealth v. Gowan, 582
A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 1990).
21. Hock, 728 A.2d at 947.
22. See id.
23. Kelly, 758 A.2d at 1288; Bryner, 652 A.2d at 910 (holding that words used may have been
provocative and annoying but were not obscene within the meaning of the disorderly statute).
24. 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5503(a)(1).
25. 18 Pa. Consol. Stat. § 5503(a)(2).
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speech. The article argues that because the "unreasonable noise" provision
was not intended to criminalize speech, it should be limited solely to
prosecutions relating to the volume of speech and not its content. With
respect to the provision prohibiting "fighting and threatening," the article
argues that to address the vagueness of the provision when applied to
offensive speech, courts need to apply a narrowing construction of the
provision. The article contends that the provision should not be given a
"fighting words" construction because the legislature evidenced an intent not
to prohibit "fighting words" by declining to adopt the language of the Model
Penal Code2 6 that specifically addresses the use of personally offensive
speech. Instead, Part III proposes a narrowing construction of the provision
based upon the United States Supreme Court's decision in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.27 Under such a construction, offensive speech would constitute
disorderly conduct if the speaker intends to incite lawless action and it is
2
likely that under the circumstances, imminent lawless action will occur.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFENSIVE SPEECH

The Supreme Court first considered the constitutional issues concerning
state regulation of offensive speech over a half a century ago in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire.29 Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was preaching and
distributing religious literature on a street corner when he was warned by a
city marshal that "the crowd was getting restless" and to "go slow."30 Some
hours later, the crowd responded violently to Chaplinsky and he was taken to
the police station for his own protection. 31 On the way, he encountered the
marshal and, apparently resentful that the police had not controlled the
crowd, Chaplinsky said to the marshal, "You are a god damn racketeer" and
"a damned Fascist and the whole government.., are Fascists. ... 32
Chaplinsky was arrested for violating a New Hampshire statute that made it
a crime to address "any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other
person ... [or] call him by any offensive or derisive name .... ,33
Chaplinsky's conviction was affirmed by the New Hampshire Supreme
Court.3 4 The court noted that the statute had been construed to apply only
where there was danger of physical violence in reaction to the words
spoken. 35 The court stated that the statute only prohibited those words which
have a "direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom,
26. Model Penal Code § 250.2(b).
27. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
28. Id. at 447.
29. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
30. State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 758 (N.H. 1941), aff'd sub. nom. Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,315 U.S. 568 (1942).
31. Id.
32. 315 U.S. at 569.
33. N.H. Pub. Laws, ch. 378 § 2 (1926), cited in State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 757.
34. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d at 763.
35. Id. at 758.
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individually, the remark is addressed."36 The court added that, as limited, the
statute "does no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to
cause a breach of the peace by the addressee .... ,,37
In upholding Chaplinsky's conviction under the statute as limited by the
New Hampshire court, the United States Supreme Court defined "fighting
words" as words which "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of the peace. '38 The Court held that the use of such
words was within a limited class of speech, the "punishment of which has
never been thought to raise a Constitutional problem. '39 The Court
concluded that such speech was not protected by the First Amendment
because it is not an "essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such
slight social value ...that any benefit ...is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality." 40 The words Chaplinsky uttered, the Court
held, were "fighting words" because they were "epithets likely to provoke
41
the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace.
The Chaplinsky decision rests upon the assumption that offensive speech
expressed in a face-to-face setting will trigger a violent response, or cause
emotional injury to an average addressee. 42 The Court did not evaluate the
actual likelihood of violence by the marshal employed to keep the peace or
take into consideration the political context of Chaplinsky's speech. Nor did
the Court explain what degree of emotional harm would cause speech to lose
its protection under the First Amendment.
In its post-Chaplinsky cases, the Supreme Court has both clarified and
limited when government can punish the use of offensive speech. In
Terminiello v. Chicago,43 the Court considered whether a public speech that
contained derisive and inflammatory rhetoric was "outside the scope of the
constitutional guarantees." 44 In the trial court, the jury had been charged
that it could find a breach of the peace if the speaker "stirs the public to
anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a

36. Id.
37. Id. at 762.
38. 315 U.S. at 572.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 574.
42. For a discussion of Chaplinsky, see e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of
Expression, 314-315 (Random House, Inc. 1970); Kent Greenwalt, Fighting Words, 50-51, 53
(Oxford Univ. Press 1995); Kent Greenwalt, Speech, Crime and the Uses of Language, 293-294
(Oxford Univ. Press 1989); Steven H. Shiffrin, Dissent, Injustice and Meanings of America, 72-74
(Princeton Univ. Press 1999); The Demise of the Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for its
Internment, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1129 (1993); Steven W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speech, 58
WASHINGTON UNIV. L.Q. 531 (1980); Michael J. Manheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93
Columbia L. Rev. (1993); Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language and the Evolution of First
Amendment Protection, 9 Harv. Civ. R.-Civ. Libs. L. Rev. (1974); Thomas F. Shea, "Don't
Bother to Smile When You Call Me That" - Fighting Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky.
L.J. 1 (1975).
43. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
44. Id. at 3.
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disturbance. '45 The Supreme Court held that the state's interest in civility
does not permit the punishment of speech that merely offends a listener's
sensibilities. 46 The trial court's instruction, the Court concluded, swept too
broadly. Speech may have "profound unsettling effects" 47 and "may best
serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates a
48
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."
Speech is not subject to punishment, the Court stated, unless it is "likely to
produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far
above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest. '49 Because Terminiello
may have been convicted for speech protected by the First Amendment, his
conviction was reversed.5 0
In Street v. New York,51 the Court rejected the argument that speech
contemptuous of the American flag lost its protection under First
Amendment because it might have offended "the sensibilities of passers-by"
who may have been shocked by Street's words.52 The Court held that any
shock effect of Street's speech "must be attributed to the content of the ideas
expressed ' 53 and that "the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
54
hearers.
Street was followed by two decisions in the early 1970s involving
defendants who had been convicted of breach of the peace for use of
offensive speech. In Cohen v. California,55 the Court considered whether the
public use of offensive language not directed at a specific individual is outside
the protection of the First Amendment. Cohen was charged with disturbing
the peace under a statute that prohibited, in part, "maliciously and willfully
disturb[ing] the peace.., by tumultuous or offensive conduct ' 56 when he
wore a jacket in Los Angeles County Courthouse bearing the words "Fuck
the Draft" as a protest against the war in Vietnam.57 In affirming Cohen's
conviction, the California Court of Appeals limited the statute to prohibit
"behavior which has a tendency to provoke others to acts of violence or to in
turn disturb the peace .. "58 The court found that the state had established
that it was "reasonably foreseeable that [Cohen's] conduct might cause
others to rise up to commit a violent act against the person of the defendant
45. Id.
46. Id. at 4 ("Speech is often provocative and challenging ... that is why freedom of speech,
though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment.").
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6.

51. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
52. Id. at 591.
53. Id. at 592.
54. Id.

55. 403 U.S. 15.
56. Id. at 16.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 17 (emphasis in original).
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59
or attempt to forcibly remove his jacket.
In reversing Cohen's conviction, the United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Harlan, rejected the claim that the case involved conduct
rather than speech. The Court held that the case did not fall within one of
the categories that government could prohibit, 6° but that the conviction
"clearly rest[ed] upon the asserted offensiveness of the words Cohen used." 61
The case did not involve obscenity, the Court concluded, because the speech
was not in any way erotic, 6 nor was the speech punishable because some
unwilling listener may have been exposed to the speech. 63 The Court also
rejected the argument that Cohen's speech constituted "fighting words,"
which the Court defined as "those personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge,
While the Court
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." 64
is
often
used
in a provocative
term
Cohen
used
acknowledged that the
of the hearer"'
not
'directed
to
the
person
here
it
was
"clearly
fashion,
reasonably
be
present
could
or
likely
to
because "[n]o individual actually
have regarded the words on his jacket as a direct personal insult." 65 The
Court then turned to the central issue in the case, namely whether the state
could "excise . . . one particular scurrilous epithet from the public
discourse." 66
The Court rejected the state's prevention of violence
justification because there was no evidence that there were individuals ready
to react violently because their "sensibilities" had been offended by Cohen's
words. 67 Merely because someone might act in such a manner is an
insufficient basis to "force persons who wish to ventilate their dissident views
into avoiding particular forms of expression." 68 Nor could the state punish
,69
Cohen to maintain "what [it] regard[s] as a suitable level of discourse ....
The Court held that the state's role as arbiter of public standards was
'70
"inherently boundless" noting that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."
Government cannot, therefore, establish clear principles by which some
speech is permitted and other words punished.7 ' In addition, the Court
recognized that speech serves a dual function of expressing both thoughts

59. Id.
60. Id. ("Further, the state certainly lacks the power to punish Cohen for the underlying
content of the message the inscription conveyed.").
61. Id. at 18 (emphasis deleted).
62. Id. at 20.
63. Id. at 22.
64. Id. at 20.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 22.
67. Id. at 23.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id. ("Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental officials cannot make principled
distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so largely to the
individual.").
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and feelings.72 The Court expressly stated, "[w]e cannot sanction the view
that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive content of individual
speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which, practically
speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall message
'73
sought to be communicated.
In holding that the words on Cohen's jacket were not "fighting words"
or otherwise punishable under the First Amendment, the Court significantly
limited the regulation of offensive speech. First, in defining "fighting words,"
the Court excluded from the definition the infliction of emotional injury as a
distinct harm of offensive speech and, instead, referred solely to the harm of
reflexive violence.7 4 While acknowledging that words on Cohen's jacket may
have been offensive to some, this fact alone was not a sufficient basis for
government to censor speech. Nor can government "cleanse public debate ,7
because it is not possible to make "principled distinctions '76 among words
that might conceivably shock one's sensibilities. Second, Cohen articulates a
broader view of the protection of the First Amendment than expressed in
Chaplinsky77 by recognizing that speech conveys not only ideas but also
emotions.78 Finally, the Court's reference to the fact that there was "no
showing that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused... ,,,79 and
that there was "no evidence that [a] substantial number of citizens [were]
standing ready to strike out physically... "0 as a result of Cohen's speech
suggests that in contrast to Chaplinsky, the Court will consider the likelihood
of violence in response to offensive speech in the context of the actual
circumstances of the speech.
Cohen was followed a year later by Gooding v. Wilson. 1

Gooding

concerned a federal habeas corpus challenge to a Georgia statute that made
it unlawful for "[a]ny person... without provocation, [to] use to or of
another, and in his presence.., opprobrious words or abusive language,
tending to cause a breach of the peace .... 82 Wilson had been convicted
under the statute for words he addressed to police officers while being
72. Id. at 26.
73. Id.
74 Greenwalt, Fighting Words, 59 (1995) (arguing that Cohen indicates that constitution
does not permit punishment of speech based solely on offensiveness of language). See also Mark
C. Rutziak, Offensive Speech and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 Harv. Civ.
Rights-Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1974) (noting the Court's failure to mention "sensibilities"
interest suggests Court no longer views injury to this interest as a justifiable basis fo publish
offensive speech).
75. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
76. Id.
77. 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (fighting words are neither an "essential part of any exposition of
ideas" nor "serve as a step to truth .... ").
78. Greenwalt, Speech, Crime & the Uses of Llanguage, at 282. (Cohen undercut[s] "any
assumption that highly emotive communications have no value as expression .....
79. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20.
80. Id. at 23.
81. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
82. Id. at 518-19 (citing Ga. Code Ann. § 26-6303).
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arrested during an anti-war demonstration for blocking the entrance to a
building used by the Army to process new military recruits. 83 To one officer
Wilson said, "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you" and to another he said, "You
son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to
pieces."" The lower federal courts had set aside Wilson's conviction on the
grounds that the statute was vague and overbroad. 85 The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether the statute had been authoritatively construed
by the Georgia courts to punish only unprotected speech and not be
"susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive . .. " that
is protected by the First Amendment. 86 After examining Georgia case law,
the Court concluded that the statute had not been construed by the Georgia
courts to be limited to words that "have a direct tendency to cause acts of
violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." 87
Instead, the Court found that the statute had been applied to punish speakers
for insulting language, for "words offensive to some who hear them ... "8 or
for "utterances where there was no likelihood that the person addressed
would make an immediate violent response ....-89 Because the Georgia
courts had failed to limit the application of the statute to "fighting words,"
the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the words Gooding used
might have been prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute.
While there is disagreement among commentators as to whether
Gooding changed the focus of the analysis from the average addressee of
Chaplinsky to the actual addressee of offensive speech, 9° there is little doubt
that Cohen and Gooding together reflect a view that the words may not be
Rather, it is clear from the
punished if they merely "inflict injury."9
language of the decisions that the only justification for prohibiting offensive
speech is the danger of an immediate violent response where words are used
in a face-to-face confrontation. This more limited view of "fighting words" is
reflected in the offensive speech cases that came before the Court following
Gooding.
In Rosenfeld v. New Jersey,92 the defendant had used the word
"motherfucking" on four occasions while addressing a public school board
83. Id. at 519, n. 1.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 520.
86. Id. (citing Cohen v. California,403 U.S. at 18-22 (1971)).
87. Id. at 524 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942)).
88. Id. at 527.
89. Id. at 528.
90. See e.g., Shea, supra n. 42, at 15 ("In Gooding, the majority found that an essential defect
in the statute.., was a failure to require the likelihood of a violent reaction on the part of the
actual addressee."); Gard, supra n. 42, at 554 ("Careful analysis demonstrates that the Supreme
Court constantly adheres to the objective standard ....). See also Greenwalt, Fighting Words
at 55 (arguing that the standard should be an objective one); Michael J. Manheimer, The
Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Columbia L. Rev. 1527, 1543 (1993) (analyzing the correctness of
Professor Gard's objectivity theory).
91. Greenwalt, supra n. 90 at 59; Rutzick, supra n. 42 at 24 ; Gard, supra n. 42 at 549.
92. 408 U.S. 901 (1972).
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meeting in which children were in attendance.93 Rosenfeld was convicted of
disorderly conduct under a statute that made it unlawful to utter "loud and
offensive or profane or indecent language in any.., public place.. . ."94
Prior to Rosenfeld's conviction, the statute had been limited by the New
Jersey Supreme Court to apply to words "of such a nature as to be likely to
incite the hearer to an immediate breach of the peace or to be likely.., to
affect the sensibilities of a hearer." 95 The Court remanded the case in light of
Cohen and Gooding over the objection of the dissenters that Chaplinsky
extends to "the willful use of scurrilous language calculated to offend the
96
sensibilities of an unwilling audience.
The Court also remanded Brown v. Oklahoma97 and Lewis v. New
Orleans" following the Gooding decision. In Brown, the defendant spoke at
a political meeting to which he had been invited and was convicted under a
statute that prohibited "any obscene or lascivious language or word in any
public place ....
-99 Unlike the statute in Rosenfeld, the Oklahoma statute
had not been narrowed by the Oklahoma courts. 100 In Lewis, the defendant,
whose son was being arrested, intervened and called the arresting officers
"'god d[amn] m[other] f[ucking]' police."' 10 1 The ordinance under which she
was convicted made it unlawful for "any person wantonly to curse or revile or
to use obscene or opprobrious language toward or with reference to any
2
member of the city police ....10
As in Brown, the statute had not been
limited by the Louisiana courts. In concurring in the remand, Justice Powell
noted that if the words Lewis used had been directed to another citizen in a
face-to-face hostile manner, they would constitute fighting words under
4
Chaplinsky.1 3 He acknowledged that the "situation may be different"'
because here the words were directed to police officers trained to exercise
restraint. 105
The Supreme Court followed the remands in the above cases by a
summary reversal in an Ohio case for the use of an unidentified offensive
word, 10 6 and a per curium reversal of the expulsion of a graduate student for
distributing an underground newspaper with a headline containing an
93. State v. Rosenfeld, 303 A.2d 889, 891 (N.J. 1973).
94. Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 904 (Powell, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (citing State v. Profaci,266 A.2d 579, 583-84 (N.J. 1970)).
96. Id. at 905.
97. 408 U.S. 914 (1972).
98. 408 U.S. 913 (1972). Lewis was remanded solely in light of Gooding.
99. Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 911 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brown, 408 U.S. at 914.
100. Brown, 408 U.S. at 914.
101. Lewis, 408 U.S. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring).
102. Rosenfeld, 408 U.S. at 909-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
103. Lewis, 408 U.S. at 913 (Powell, J., concurring).
104. Id.
105. Id. (Justice Powell cited Model Penal Code § 250.1, comment 14 (Tent. Draft No. 13,
1961)). For a discussion of police officers as addressees of offensive speech, see Shea, supra n. 42
at 19; Gard, supra n. 38 at 556-58. See also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462 (1987)
(noting Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Lewis).
106. Cason v. Columbus, 409 U.S. 1053 (1972).
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offensive word. 107 In another case, Hess v. Indiana,1°8 the Court reversed
Hess's conviction for disorderly conduct for telling a crowd during an antiwar demonstration, "We'll take the fucking street later."' 109 Although a
sheriff who was present in the crowd testified that he was offended by Hess's
language, the Court held that the language did not amount to fighting words
because the statement "was not addressed to any person or group in
particular." 110
Lewis v. New Orleans"' returned to the Supreme Court in 1974. The
Court concluded that on remand the Louisiana Supreme Court failed to
make any "meaningful attempt to limit or properly define - as limited by
Chaplinsky and Gooding... 112 the terms in the ordinance and, therefore, it
was immaterial whether the defendant's speech might be punished under a
properly limited statute."' The statute's defect, the Court stated, was that it
was "susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive" that
114
is protected by the First Amendment.
Following Lewis II, the Court remanded a number of cases" 5 involving
convictions under statutes and ordinances prohibiting the expression of
words variously described as "vulgar," "rude," "profane," "violent," or
"insulting" in light of Lewis v. New Orleans. Justice Douglas dissented from
the remands, 116 arguing that the Court should reverse the convictions because
state courts had consistently failed to narrow their breach of peace or
disorderly conduct statutes in light of Terminiello"7 and Gooding."'
Almost twenty years passed before the Supreme Court again addressed
the issue of offensive speech. In R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul,119 the defendant
was convicted of violating the City's Bias Motivated Crime Ordinance for
burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American family. 20 The ordinance
provided that it was unlawful to place "on public or private property a
symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti (sic), including, but

107. Papishv. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
108. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
109. Id. at 107.
110. Id.
111. 415 U.S. 132 (1974).
112. Id. at 133.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 134. See also id. at 135-36. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell noted that apart
from the ambiguity of the terms of the statute, whether a speaker has used "fighting words"
depended upon the circumstances in which the words were uttered. Justice Powell thought it
unlikely that the words used by Mrs. Lewis would have precipitated a physical confrontation
with the police officer because a properly trained officer may be expected to exercise restraint in
the face of words expressing anger and frustration. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
115. Lucas v. Arkansas, 416 U.S. 919 (1974); Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Rosen v.
California,416 U.S. 924 (1974); Karlan v. City of Cincinnati,416 U.S. 924 (1974).
116. Karlanv. City of Cincinnati,416 U.S. 924 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
117. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
118. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
119. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
120. Id. at 379.
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not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has
reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly
conduct .... 1 21
All members of the Court found the ordinance
unconstitutional. 122 A five member majority accepted the Minnesota
Supreme Court's construction of the ordinance to reach only fighting words
within the meaning of Chaplinsky.1 3 Fighting words, the majority
acknowledged are not without expressive content and, like other forms of
expression that have been found to be outside the protection of the First
Amendment, are nonetheless not "entirely invisible
to the
Constitution ... .,,124 The ordinance's defect, the majority held, was that it
allowed the state to punish only certain types of "fighting words" while
permitting other forms of offensive speech thereby violating the established
First Amendment rule that "presumptively places [content-based]
discrimination beyond the power of the government."' 25 In other words,
even though fighting words constitute a class of proscribable speech,
government may not regulate their use "based on hostility - or favoritism towards the underlying message expressed. 1' 26 The defect of the St. Paul
ordinance, the majority explained, is that it prohibited expressions of hate
speech based upon race, color, creed or gender but not on political affiliation,
union membership or sexual orientation. 127 Only speech that "communicates
messages of racial, gender or religious intolerance" is prohibited, while
28
speech expressing hostility in connection with other ideas is not covered.'
The First Amendment, the majority concluded, "does not permit St. Paul to
impose special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on
disfavored subjects."' 29

Concurring only in the judgment, the remaining Justices believed that
the ordinance was unconstitutional on overbreadth grounds because as
construed, the ordinance makes speech unlawful that causes "anger, alarm or
resentment ... ,130 thereby reaching beyond fighting words. "The mere fact
that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does not

121. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Leg. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
122. Id. at 380.
123. Id. at 396.
124. Id. at 383.
125. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y State Crimes Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
116 (1991). See also Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972)
("Once a forum is opened to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not
prohibit others from assembling and speaking on the basis of what they intend to say."); Note,
Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1854, 1856, n. 15
(1983)).
126. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 386.
127. Id. at 391.
128. Id. at 394.
129. Id. at 391.
130. Id. at 413 (White, J., joined by Blackmun, Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the
judgment) (citing In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (1991)).
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render the expression unprotected."''
Although the Supreme Court has not overruled Chaplinsky, its more
recent decisions make clear that offensive speech statutes are constitutional if
written or narrowly construed to reach language spoken in a face-to-face
13 2
context where the speech creates a likelihood of immediate violence.
Offensive speech that is claimed to cause emotional harm or otherwise
offends the sensibilities of listeners is arguably no longer part of the
definition of fighting words. 133 R.A.V. further limits restrictions on offensive
speech by holding that even though "fighting words," as a category of speech,
are outside the protection of the First Amendment, government is precluded
by the Constitution from singling out for punishment what it thinks are
particularly egregious forms of offensive speech."M
II.

OFFENSIVE SPEECH AND THE PENNSYLVANIA DISORDERLY CONDUCT

STATUTE

Pennsylvania, like most states, has sought to regulate offensive speech
by means of its disorderly conduct statute. Prior to 1972, the disorderly
conduct statute made it unlawful to make any "loud, boisterous and
unseemly noise to the annoyance of the peaceable residents nearby .... ,135
In Commonwealth v. Greene,13 6 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed
"unseemly" as "not fitting or proper in respect to the conventional standards
of organized society or a legally constituted community.' ' 37 Under the
statute, courts sustained convictions for disorderly conduct where defendants
directed "vile, "138 "abusive,"139 or "foul"''140 language toward members of the
public or the police.' 4' Although a federal court refused to find the statute
unconstitutionally vague, 142 Justice Cohen, in a concurring opinion in Greene,
stated that he was "troubled by the imprecise and vague standards"'143 in the
disorderly conduct statute and suggested that the legislature consider the
disorderly conduct provision of the Model Penal Code' 44 in subsequent

131. Id. at 414.
132. Gooding,405 U.S. at 524-25; Lewis, 415 U.S. at 132-13.
133. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20; Hess, 414 U.S. at 107-108; see also Greenwalt, supra n. 90 at 59;
Gard, supra n. 42 at 549.
134. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 386.
135. Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, as amended, 18 P.S. § 4406 (repealed).
136. 189 A.2d 141 (1963).
137. Id. at 143.
138. Commonwealth ex rel. Jenkins v. Costello, 14 A.2d 567, 569 (Pa. Super. 1940).
139. Commonwealth v. Cooper, 95 Pa. Super. 382, 385 (1929).
140. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 274 A.2d 762, 763 (Pa. 1971).
141. For a discussion of disorderly conduct in Pennsylvania prior to the enactment of the
Crimes Code in 1972, see Victor R. Delle Donne, PublicDisorderOffenses Under Pennsylvania's
New Crimes Code, 78 Dick L. Rev. 15 (1973).
142. Heardv. Rizzo, 281 F. Supp. 720, 724 (E.D. Pa. 1968), affd, 392 U.S. 646 (1969).
143. 189 A.2d at 147 (Cohen, J., concurring).
144. Id. (referring to § 250.1 Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 13 (1961)).
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145
amendments to the Crimes Code.

In 1972, the legislature enacted the current Crimes Code. Like other
provisions of the Code, the disorderly conduct statute' 46 is based upon the
Model Penal Code. 147 The statute makes it unlawful, if "with intent to cause

public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm or recklessly creating a risk
thereof"'148 a person (1) "engages in fighting or threatening, or in violent or
tumultuous behavior; 49 (2) makes unreasonable noise; 150 (3) uses obscene

language, or makes an obscene gesture;' 5 ' or (4) creates a hazardous or
physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose
of the actor.'1 52 The term "public" is broadly defined to mean "affecting or
likely to affect persons in a place to which the public" has access.'53

Disorderly conduct may be graded as either a misdemeanor or summary

offense depending upon the actor's intent. 15 4 While the mens rea portion of

the statute and subsections (1) and (4) and part of subsection (2) of the
statute follow the language of the Model Penal Code, the legislature did not
adopt the language of the Model Code that prohibits a person from making
an "offensively coarse utterance, gesture or display"'35 or addressing "abusive

language to any person present .... ",156 Instead, as noted above, the
disorderly conduct statute in subsection (3) prohibits the use of "obscene
language" or gestures. Although the Pennsylvania statute does not expressly
prohibit the use of offensive speech, courts have sustained disorderly conduct

convictions for offensive speech under the "unreasonable noise"' 5 7 and
"obscene language' 15 8 provisions of the statute.

59

145. Greene, 189 A.2d at 147 (Cohen, J., concurring).
146. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503.
147. Model Penal Code § 250.2 (ALl 1912).
148. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a).
149. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).
150. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2).
151. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3).
152. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4).
153. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(c).
154. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503(b).
155. Model Penal Code § 250.2(1)(b).
156. Id.
157. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2).
158. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(3).
159. The issue of offensive speech under the current disorderly conduct statute was first
considered by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Hughes, 410 A.2d 1272 (Pa. Super. 1979).
It is not clear from the decision what provision of the statute Hughes was charged with violating.
Hughes was arrested after she was refused admittance to a party. She subsequently crossed the
street and began yelling "obscenities and threats" at the home where the party was being held.
When the police arrived, Hughes continued to shout and yell at the officers. In affirming
Hughes' conviction, the court held that the lower court could properly find the defendant guilty
of disorderly conduct for shouting "threats and obscenities at members of the general public and
police... with reckless disregard of [the] clear risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or
Id. at 1273.
alarm ....
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Offensive Speech as UnreasonableNoise

The constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute was first
considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1980 in Commonwealth v.
Mastrangelo.16 Mastrangelo was convicted of obstructing the administration
of law and of violating subsection (a)(2) of the disorderly conduct statute by
making an "unreasonable noise." Mastrangelo had shouted at a meter maid
who had ticketed his illegally parked car, calling her a "fucking pig"'161 and
had used similarly offensive language when the meter maid returned the
following day. The meter maid testified that bystanders had observed
Mastrangelo's conduct and that his actions had frightened her.1 62 Other than
noting that Mastrangelo shouted at the meter maid, the facts do not reveal
the volume at which Mastrangelo addressed his remarks to the meter maid.
On appeal, Mastrangelo claimed that the statute was facially invalid on
grounds of vagueness because the terms of the statute were imprecise and, in
163
the alternative, the statute was invalid as applied to him.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that due
process requires that penal statutes be drafted with sufficient clarity to
provide notice of the conduct prohibited by the statute and that where a
defendant claims that a statute is facially vague or overbroad in violation of
the First Amendment, the statute is analyzed on its face and not in light of
the facts of the defendant's own conduct. 64 Noting that the case presented
the first opportunity for the court to examine the constitutionality of the
statute, the court stated that it was obligated to "narrow and limit"'165 the
statute in light of protections guaranteed by the federal and state
constitutions.
160. 414 A.2d 54 (Pa. 1980), appeal dismissed, Mastrangelo v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 894
(1980).
Questions about whether provisions of the disorderly conduct statute are
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad were initially raised in the context of constitutional
challenges to § 5502 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5502 which requires disorderly persons
to disperse upon official order. In Commonwealth v. Cook, 361 A.2d 274 (Pa. 1976), the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court declaring § 5502
unconstitutional on grounds of vagueness. The court concluded a remand was required because
the record contained no facts concerning defendant's alleged violation of § 5502. Concurring in
the remand, Justice Pomeroy noted that § 5502 must be read in para materia with the disorderly
conduct statute and that the constitutionality of § 5502 depended upon the constitutionality of
the incorporated provisions of the disorderly conduct statute. Justice Pomeroy noted that both
the "unreasonable noise" and "use of obscene language" provisions of the statute "could give
rise to colorable claims that the enforcement of the subsections could infringe on the exercise of
the public's First Amendment freedoms ..
i.."
Id. at 278. See also Commonwealth v.
DeFrancesco, 393 A.2d 321 (Pa. 1978). Justice Roberts, dissenting from the Court's decision
upholding the constitutionality of § 5502, stated that the provisions of the disorderly conduct "do
not draw acceptably 'clear' lines" thus requiring the public to guess at the meaning of the terms
in the statute with the result that individuals may "forego constitutionally protected conduct or
speech." Id. at 334.
161. Mastrangelo,441 A.2d at 55.
162. Id. at 56.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh,354 A.2d 244, 245 (1976)).
165. Id. at 57.
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The court's narrowing construction of the statute began with the court
noting that states "may enact laws to protect the peace" 166 and that the
present statute, unlike its predecessor, reaches only conduct where there is an
unlawful intent to create a risk of public inconvenience "by making an
unreasonable noise. '167 Next, using the definition of "unseemly" from the
prior disorderly conduct statute,' 68 the court defined "unreasonable noise" as
"not fitting or proper in respect to the conventional standards of organized
society or a legally construed community." 169 Finally, the court stated that it
believed that "a man of common intelligence would understand what is and
what is not made criminal under [the] statute, especially after we now make
clear that the disorderly conduct statute may not be used to punish anyone
exercising a protected First Amendment right. ' 170 Having so limited the
statute, the court held that Mastrangelo's facial attack on the vagueness of
171
the statute was without merit.
The court next turned to whether the statute was constitutionally
applied to Mastrangelo. Citing only Chaplinksy,172 the court concluded that
the words Mastrangelo directed to the meter maid in a "loud, boisterous and
disorderly fashion"' 173 were "fighting words" and that under its "narrow
construction" 174 of the statute, there was no merit to the claim that the statute
was unconstitutionally invalid as applied to him.
Justice Roberts, concurring and dissenting, argued that there was
insufficient evidence to convict Mastrangelo of disorderly conduct because
there was nothing in the record to support the finding that the words used
produced "unreasonable noise. 1 75 In Justice Roberts view, the prohibition
against "unreasonable noise" was not intended to criminalize speech. Justice
Flaherty, in dissent, argued that the statute remained unconstitutionally
'1 76
vague as "one must speculate as to its meaning and application.'
A number of issues in Mastrangelo merit comment. First, noticeably
missing from the court's analysis of the "unreasonable noise" section of the
statute1 77 is reference to the Model Penal Code. 17

As noted, the disorderly

conduct statute tracks almost verbatim Section 250.2 of the Code. 7 9 The
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 58 (quoting Commonwealth v. Greene, 189 A.2d at 143).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id at 60 (Roberts, J., concurring & dissenting).
176. Id. (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
177. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(2).
178. The Comments to the Model Penal Code are considered non-binding, "but may be used
to resolve problems in interpreting Crimes Code provisions." Commonwealth v. Shoemaker,437
A.2d 999, 1002 n. 2 (Pa. Super. 1981); see also Commonwealth v. Brown, 375 A.2d 331, 334 n. 4
(Pa. 1977); cf Heinbaugh,354 A.2d at 247.
179. Model Penal Code § 250.2 (1962).
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Comment to Section 250.2 makes clear that the "unreasonable noise"
provision is "concerned not with the content of speech but with its
volume."' 180 As Justice Roberts noted, there was nothing in the record to
suggest that Mastrangelo's words produced "unreasonable noise."'' Clearly,
it was what Mastrangelo said to the meter maid and not the volume of his
speech that the majority found objectionable. As Justice Roberts correctly
concluded, the "unreasonable noise" section of the disorderly conduct statute
182
was "plainly not intended to criminalize speech ....Second, the court failed to do what it said it was constitutionally
"obligated"' 183 to do when confronted with a statute that is unconstitutionally
vague, namely provide a limiting construction of the statute consistent with
controlling Supreme Court precedent.'
The decision does not construe the
"unreasonable noise" section of the statute in light of the Supreme Court's
post-Chaplinsky decisions in Cohen'85 and Gooding.186 Specifically, the court
failed to limit the statute to words "that have a direct tendency to cause acts
' 87
of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed.'
Instead, by defining "unreasonable noise" as "not fitting or proper in respect
to the conventional standards of organized society,"'8 the statute "sweeps
too broadly.' ' 89 Post-Chaplinsky Supreme Court cases establish that speech
does not lose its protection under the First Amendment merely because it is
not "fitting" or "proper." 19 Given the range of speech that is punishable
under the court's definition of "unreasonable noise" in Mastrangelo, there is
no doubt that the statute remains "susceptible of application to protected
expression"' 191 and is, therefore, unconstitutional. Moreover, the court's
definition of "unreasonable noise" is as vague as the term it defines, raising
issues of both fair notice to speakers of what language is prohibited' 92 and the
danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. 193
180. Id. at Comment p. 346.
181. Mastrangelo,414 A.2d at 60 (Roberts, J., concurring & dissenting).
182. Id. It is an accepted principle of statutory construction that a "court may not achieve an
acceptable construction of a penal statute by reading into the statute terms that broaden its
scope." Commonwealth v. Booth, 766 A.2d 843, 846 (Pa. 2001); see also Commonwealth v.
Fisher,400 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. 1979).
183. Mastrangelo,414 A.2d at 57.
184. Id.
185. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15.
186. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
187. Id. at 524.
188. Mastrangelo.414 A.2d at 58 (citing Greene, 189 A.2d at 143).
189. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 527.
190. See e.g. Terminello, 337 U.S. 1; Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Wilson, 405 U.S.
525; Lewis, 415 U.S. 130.
191. Wilson, 405 U.S. at 522.
192. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999) (establishing that "vagueness may
invalidate a criminal law... [because] it fail[s] to provide the kind of notice that will enable
ordinary people to understand what conduct it prohibits ....
");see also Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966);
Langetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
193. Morales, 527 U.S. at 56; Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Houston v. Hill,
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Lastly, the courts' statement that the statute may not be used to punish
speakers exercising rights protected by the First Amendment is not a limiting
construction. It offers no guidance to either speakers or those charged with
enforcing the statute. 194 Rather, it is simply a restatement of established First
Amendment precedent. The fact that the court concludes that the statute, as
applied, was not unconstitutional because Mastrangelo's speech constituted
"fighting words" does not cure the vagueness of the statute. A finding that a
defendant's speech is unprotected is not a substitute for a narrowing
construction of the statute. 195 As noted above, the Supreme Court has
remanded offensive speech cases where the state court failed to narrowly
construe the statute and, instead, simply found that the words the speaker
used were prohibited.1 96 The purpose of permitting a defendant to facially
challenge an unconstitutional statute without demonstrating that his speech
could not be punished by a properly limited statute is that the "continued
existence of the statute in unnarrowed form.., tend(s) to suppress
constitutionally protected rights.' 1 97 Notwithstanding the court's claim in
Mastrangelo to have limited subsection (a)(2) of the Pennsylvania statute, the
subsection remains unconstitutionally vague requiring speakers to "speculate
'198
[as to] its meaning and application.
The "unreasonable noise" provision of the statute has been considered
by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in several post-Mastrangelocases. 99 In
contrast to Mastrangelo, the Superior Court has viewed the provision as
regulating the volume and not the content of speech. Although the issue of
personally offensive speech as "unreasonable noise" has not been directly
considered by the Superior Court and appellants have not challenged the
constitutionality of the provision, the court has held that speech can not be
punished as "unreasonable noise" merely because it is annoying. 2°° The court
has emphasized that the disorderly conduct statute "must not be used as a
catchall or dragnet for the prosecution of conduct that is uncivil, annoying or

482 U.S. 451,465 (1986); Coates,402 U.S. at 616.
194. See Lawrence H. Tribe, American Cnstitutional Law § 12-26, at 716 (1998) ("Constitution
does not, in and of itself, provide a bright enough line to guide primary conduct .. ");Melville
B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.11[E], 4-159 (1984) ("There would be no
need.., for the myriad.., works on the First Amendment, if the concept of "constitutionally
protected speech" was clear even to lawyers and scholars."). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 162 (1974).
195. Coates, 402 U.S. at 616 ("The details of the offense could no more serve to validate this
ordinance than could the details of an offense charged under an ordinance suspending
unconstitutionally the right of assembly and free speech."); Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520 ("It matters
not that the words appellee used might have been constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly
and precisely drawn statute.").
196. Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); see Karlan v. City of Cincinnati,416 U.S. 924, 930
(1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (discussing Kelly).
197. Coates, 402 U.S. at 620 (White, J., dissenting).
198. Mastrangelo,414 A.2d at 60 (Flaherty, J., dissenting).
199. See Commonwealth v. Gilbert,674 A.2d 284 (Pa. Super. 1996); Commonwealth v. Gowan,
582 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 1990).
200. Gowan, 582 A.2d at 881.
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irritating. "201
B. Offensive Speech as Obscene Language
Following Mastrangelo, the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct
statute was next considered by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v.
Pringle.20 2 Pringle was charged with violating subsection (a)(3) of the
disorderly conduct statute which makes it unlawful to use "obscene
language" when she shouted "goddamn fucking pigs ' 203 at police officers
whom she believed were using excessive force in arresting a friend of hers.
At trial, Pringle argued that the "obscene language" provision of the statute
was facially unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. In addition, she
claimed that the words she used were not obscene as defined by the United
States Supreme Court in Miller v. California.2°4 With respect to the
vagueness of the statute, the arresting officers were asked at trial how they
determined whether language was obscene. In response, one of the arresting
officers testified that he defined "obscene language" as "not ordinary words
that an ordinary individual would use. '205 The other officer stated "If I can't
use it against the public, then I would assume it is obscene .... ,,206 In
affirming Pringle's conviction, the Superior Court rejected her argument that
the "obscene language" provision of the statute had not been authoritatively
construed to reach only unprotected speech holding that Pringle's claim had
been "specifically examined and rejected" 2°7 by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in Mastrangelo. The court also held that Pringle's reliance on Cohen v.
California20 8 and Hess v. Indiana,209 cases in which the United States Supreme
Court held that the word "fuck" was not obscene because its use in those
cases had nothing to do with sexual conduct, were "completely out of
context" 210 because Pringle's words were directed to police officers. Finally,
the court concluded that the words Pringle used were "fighting words" within
the meaning of Chaplinsky2t ' because "by their very utterance they inflict
'212
injury.
As noted above, Mastrangelo concerned section (a)(2) of the disorderly

201. Gilbert,674 A.2d at 287.
202. 450 A.2d 103 (Pa. Super. 1982). Prior to Pringle, the Superior Court affirmed a
conviction for disorderly conduct where the defendant shouted obscenities at police officers. It
is not clear from the decision what provision fo the statute defendant was charged with violating.
Commonwealth v. Kidd, 442 A.2d 826 (Pa. Super. 1982).
203. Pringle,450 A.2d at 105.
204. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
205. Brief for Appellant at p.14, Commonwealth v. Pringle,450 A.2d 103 (Pa. Super. 1982).
206. Id.
207. Pringle,450 A.2d at 106.
208. 403 U.S. 15.
209. 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
210. Pringle,450 A.2d at 106.
211. 315 U.S. at 573.
212. Pringle, 450 A.2d at 107. The Superior Court relied upon Pringle in affirming a
disorderly conduct conviction in Commonwealth v. Crawford,483 A.2d 916 (Pa. Super. 1984).
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conduct statute prohibiting the making of an "unreasonable noise." There is
no discussion in Mastrangelo of section (a)(3) of the statute concerning the
use of "obscene language." Clearly, Pringle's claims were not considered by
the court in Mastrangelo. But even if Mastrangelo could be construed as

providing a narrowing construction of the entire disorderly conduct statute,
Mastrangelo was decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court after Pringle
was charged and convicted of disorderly conduct. 213 Consequently, Pringle,

the arresting officers, and the trial court did not benefit from the Mastrangelo
decision. Finally, the Superior Court's holding that Pringle's speech
constituted "fighting words" because they inflicted injury upon the arresting
officers ignores the Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky decisions that exclude
injury to an addressee's sensibilities as a permissible basis for punishing
speech.

2 14

2 15
After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to hear her appeal,
216
Pringle sought habeas corpus relief in the federal courts.
The district court
denied relief holding that although the Pennsylvania courts had not provided

the narrowed construction of the "obscene language" provision of the
disorderly conduct statute, the provision was not unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad. It also held that because Pringle's speech constituted "fighting
words," the court was not required to reach the issue of whether the words
21 7
were obscene.
The Third Circuit, in a per curium opinion, reversed the district court
holding that the "obscene language" provision of the statute was
unconstitutionally vague at the time of Pringle's conduct and charge and,

therefore, her conviction violated her right to due process of law.2 18 The

court held that even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Mastrangelo constituted a narrowing construction of the entire statute, an
issue which the court specifically did not address or resolve, Mastrangelo was

213. The decision in Mastranglo was rendered on April 28, 1980. Pringle was charged with
disorderly conduct on September 28, 1979 and her trial in the Court of Common Pleas of
Cumberland County occurred on April 1, 1980.
214. In both Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 and Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524, the Court excluded injury to
sensibilities from its definition of "fighting words." See Mark C. Rutzick, Offensive Language
and the Evolution of First Amendment Protection, 9 Harv. C. Rights - Lib. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1974);
Greenwalt, Fighting Words, supra n. 42 at 284; Mannheimer, supra n. 42 at 1542; The Demise of
the Chaplinsky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument for its Internment, 106 Harv. L. Rev.,
1129, 1138 (1993).
215. Commonwealth v. Pringle,No. 587 E.D. Alloc. Dkt. 1982 (January 18, 1983).
216. Pringle's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was initially dismissed by the district court
on the grounds that a separate appeal of her sentence was pending in state court. Pringle v.
Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, No. 83-0364 (M.D. Pa. June 30, 1983). The
Third Circuit reversed the district court holding that petitioner had exhausted her federal
constitutional claims in the Pennsylvania courts and remanded the case to the district court for
consideration of the merits of the constitutional claims. Pringlev. Court of Common Pleas, 744
F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1984).
217. Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, 604 F. Supp. 623, 630 (M.D.
Pa. 1985).
218. Pringlev. Court of Common Pleas, 778 F.2d 998, 1004 (3d Cir. 1985).
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decided after Pringle's conduct and charge and that the narrowed
construction of the statute cannot be applied retroactively. 219 Disagreeing
with the district court, the court concluded that in the absence of a narrowing
construction, the plain words of the "obscene language" section of the statute
were unconstitutionally vague. 220 The court concluded that Pringle did not
know that at the time of her conduct that the word she used, though not
found obscene in Hess v. Indiana,221 was in fact obscene in Pennsylvania if
"spoken to cause a public disturbance and directed to police officers. ' 222 In
other words, the statute "did not meet the constitutional requirements of
adequate notice. ' 223 The court noted that Pringle's claim that the statute
remained unconstitutionally vague after Mastrangelo and the Superior
Court's decision was a matter that would need to be asserted by others in
224
later prosecutions under the statute.
The issue of whether offensive words directed to the police constituted
disorderly conduct was again considered by the Superior Court in
Commonwealth v. Weiss. 225 Weiss was charged and convicted of violating
subsection (a)(3) of the statute for directing allegedly obscene words to a
police officer after the officer entered her home to arrest her husband. 226
Weiss did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Rather, she
argued that because the words she used were directed to the officer inside
her home, the state failed to prove that her words were uttered with the
intent to cause "public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly
creating a risk thereof ...."227 In reversing her conviction on the grounds
that the required intent under that statute was not established, the court
distinguished Mastrangelo and Pringle as cases involving speakers who made
offensive statements in public settings. 22 8 The court further distinguished
Mastrangelo as a case brought under the "unreasonable noise" and not the
"obscene language" provision of the statute.2 29 Even though a neighbor
overheard the words Weiss used, the court held that vulgar language,
"however distasteful or offensive to one's sensibilities" may not be punished
merely because people nearby hear the words. 230 Finally, the Court rejected
an interpretation of the statute that would permit the punishment of
offensive speech directed to police officers on grounds that such speech
2 31
inflicts injury or causes officers to react in a violent manner to the speaker.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 1002.
Id.
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
Pringle,778 F.2d at 1003 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1005 n. 9.
490 A.2d 853, 855 (Pa. Super. 1985).
Id. at 854.
Id. at 854-55 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)).
Weiss, 490 A.2d at 855-56.
Id. at 855 n. 2.
Id. at 856. (citing People v. Douglas,331 N.E.2d 359, 363 (1975)).
Weiss, 490 A.2d at 855-56.
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The Court found no risk that the officer would respond in a violent manner

to Mrs. Weiss' "verbal assault" 23 2 noting that officers are experienced in
,"233
dealing with people in "emotionally charged situations ....
The Superior Court returned to the issue of obscene speech as a basis for
disorderly conduct in Commonwealth v. Bryner.234 Like Weiss, Bryner was
also convicted of using "obscene language" in violation of subsection (a)(3)

of the statute. However, unlike the facts in Weiss, Bryner's language, "go to

hell, Betsy"2 35 was made in public in the presence of several hundred people.
On appeal, Bryner argued that his words were neither obscene nor "fighting
words. '236 In reversing Bryner's conviction, the court noted that the word
"obscene" had not been defined by the Superior Court in Pringle.237

Adopting the United States Supreme Court's definition of obscenity in Miller
v. California,238 the court held that because Bryner's words did not "appeal to

anyone's prurient interests," they were not obscene within the meaning of
subsection (a)(3) of the disorderly conduct statute. 239 The court concluded

that it was not necessary to consider whether Bryner's words constituted
"fighting words" because the issue involves a "separate and distinct analysis"

which it did not have to reach because "subsection (a)(3) of the statute is
' '24°
narrowly drawn to prohibit only obscene words or gestures.
Bryner is significant because it is the first decision of a Pennsylvania
court that defines the term "obscene" in the disorderly conduct statute. In

addition, the decision makes clear that subsection (a)(3) does not apply to
"fighting words" as the court had previously concluded in Pringle. Rather, a
prosecution under subsection (a)(3) of the statute is limited solely to words
241
or gestures that meet the Miller definition of obscenity.

232. Id.
233. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Bender, 375 A.2d 254, 359 (1977)).
234. 652 A.2d 909 (Pa. Super. 1995).
235. Id. at 910.
236. Id. at 910-11 (quoting 18 Pa.C.S. § 5503(a)(3)).
237. Bryner, 652 A.2d at 911.
238. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
239. Bryner, 652 A.2d at 912 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
240. Id. at 912 n. 4.
241. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Kelly, 758 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2000) (stating that the court
relied on Bryner in finding Kelly's offensive language and gesture directed to a city employee
was not "obscene" within the meaning of Section 5503(a)(3)); Broackway v. Sheperd, 942 F.
Supp. 1012 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (noting that while the court believed the intent of subsection (a)(3)
of the statute was to prevent the use of offensive speech that could anger police officers or
encourage others to interfere with their duties, subsection (a)(3) had been interpreted by the
court in Bryner to reach only language or gestures that meet the Miller definition of obscenity);
United States v. McDermott, 971 F. Supp. 939 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (concluding that the use of words
"bullshit" and "fuck," while distasteful to the addressee, were not "obscene" under subsection
(a)(3) of the statute because they were not sexual in nature); but see Russali v. Salisbury
Township, 126 F. Supp.2d 821, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (reviewing issue of qualified immunity
determined on basis of case law prior to Hock).
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C. Offensive Speech as Fightingor Threatening Behavior
In addition to the "unreasonable noise" and "obscene language"
provisions of the statute, offensive speech has also been prosecuted as a
violation of subsection (a)(1) of the statute that prohibits "fighting or
threatening" behavior. 242 In Commonwealth v. Hock, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court considered the issue of offensive speech directed toward a
police officer.

243

After being questioned by a police officer concerning whether she was
driving without a valid driver's license, Hock exited her car and in walking
away from the officer who was seated in his vehicle, said to the officer "Fuck
you, asshole. '' 244 The officer exited his vehicle and told Hock that she was
under arrest.245

Hock walked away from the officer and entered her

apartment building at which time a struggle ensued causing minor injuries to
the officer. 246 Hock was subsequently charged with resisting arrest as well as
disorderly conduct. 247 The trial court dismissed the charges concluding that
there was no probable cause to arrest Hock for disorderly conduct and,
therefore, no basis for the resisting arrest charge. 248
The Superior Court reversed, finding that the officer had probable cause
to arrest Hock for her failure to produce her driver's license and for the
offensive remark she addressed to the officer. 249 Even though the court
noted that the disorderly conduct charge was not based on the words she
addressed to the officer, the court nonetheless concluded that on the basis of
Mastrangelo and Pringle, Hock's remark constituted "fighting words. ' 250 In
addition, the court held that her insult and refusal to obey the command of
the officer constituted "fighting... behavior" 1l in violation of subsection
(a)(1) of the statute.2 12 The court's holding was based on the fact that Hock's
remark was made in a public place and any violent response by the officer
would have affected a passersby thereby creating public alarm 3 The court
rejected the holdings of some state courts that offensive speech directed to
police officers does not constitute disorderly conduct because of the training

242. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).
243. 728 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa. 1999); see generally Commonwealth v. DeLuca, 597 A.2d 1121,
1123 (Pa. 1991) (concluding that the defendant had engaged in disorderly conduct when he told
officers to "Get out of my f____ way" because he had "recklessly created a risk of public alarm,
annoyance or inconvenience").
244. Hock, 728 A.2d at 944.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 945 (stating that the disorderly conduct charge was under subsection (a)(4) of the
statute for creating a "hazardous or physically offensive condition" based upon Hock's struggle
with the officer during the arrest).
248. Id. at 944-45.
249. Commonwealth v. Hock, 696 A.2d 225,230 (Pa. Super. 1997).
250. Id. at 228.
251. Hock, 696 A.2d at 228.
252. Id. (quoting § 5503 (a)(1)).
253. Hock, 696 A.2d at 228.
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officers receive and their duty not to retaliate. 254 Finding such an approach
not "appropriate for Pennsylvania," the court concluded that addressing
"fighting words" to a police officer has no less legal significance than speech
addressed to a layperson.2 51 Because the officer had probable cause to arrest
Hock for the words she addressed to him, the court concluded that her
256
conduct in resisting arrest was unlawful.
In reversing the Superior Court, the Supreme Court rejected the
Commonwealth's contention that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Hock because her offensive speech constituted "fighting words" in violation
of subsection (a)(1) of the statute .2 7 The court found that Mastrangelo was
not controlling because Hock's speech involved a single epithet delivered in a
normal tone of voice which did not alarm the officer and was spoken in a
location where others were not present. 258 Noting that in determining
whether speech constitutes "fighting words" the circumstances surrounding
the use of the words must be considered, the court concluded that Hock's
single comment did not risk an immediate breach of the peace. 259 The court
also rejected the Superior Court's view that Hock's words were punishable
26°
on the grounds that the officer might have reacted in a violent manner.
Adopting the position of other state courts, 261 the court held that because the
police have a duty to enforce the law "there is reason to presume that they
will not violate the law. ' 262 Construing the statute narrowly, the court
concluded that it may not be used as a "vehicle to protect the police from all
verbal indignities, especially under the dubious hypothesis that officers are
likely to break the law when affronted. '263 Finally, the court noted that a per
se ban of the words Hock used would "implicate substantial First
'' 264
Amendment concerns.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Castille argued that under subsection
(a)(1) of the statute a person engages in disorderly conduct if, in a public
place, he or she directs vulgar and offensive words to the police. Hock's
speech constituted "fighting words" even though her words were not shouted
and others were not present because, if the words had been addressed to a
layperson, the words would have had a "direct tendency to incite" an act of

254. Id. (citing Swann v. Huntsville, 455 So.2d 944, 950 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984); City of
Chicago v. Blakemore, 305 N.E.2d 687, 689 (Ill.App. 1973); e.g. Harrison v. City of Tulsa, 713
P.2d 700 (Colo.1987); State v.John W., 418 A.2d 1097, 1108 (Me. 1980); Diehl v.State, 451 A.2d
115, 123 (Md. 1982); see e.g. In re W.H.L., 743 A.2d 1226, 1229 (D.C. 2000) (noting in dicta that
police training creates a higher tolerance threshold).
255. Hock, 696 A.2d at 229.
256. Id. at 230.
257. Hock, 728 A.2d at 947.
258. Id. at 946.
259. Id. at 947.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 947 (citing Blakemore, 305 N.E.2d at 689).
263. Hock, 728 A.2d at 947.
264. Id. at 947 n. 4.
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violence.265 In short, Justice Castille's view is that fighting words directed to a
police officer have the same legal significance as those directed to others.
Hock significantly limits the prosecution of offensive speech directed to
police officers. While the court in Hock did not limit subsection (a)(1) of the
statute to "fighting words" defined by post-Chaplinsky decisions, the decision
rejects a central premise of the "fighting words" doctrine as applied to police
officers. Specifically, it rejects the idea that the danger of reflexive violence
by the officer is, by itself, an acceptable basis to punish the use of offensive
speech as disorderly conduct. Moreover, Hock implicitly rejects the view
that injury to a police officer's sensibilities is grounds to punish the use of
Instead, in
offensive speech under the disorderly conduct statute.
determining whether offensive speech directed to police officers constitutes
disorderly conduct, Hock adopts a fact specific standard that requires
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the use of the offensive
words including the presence or absence of bystanders and the manner in
which the words were delivered.
III. OFFENSIVE SPEECH POST-BRYNER AND HOCK AND A PROPOSAL FOR
CONSTRUING THE "FIGHTING OR THREATENING" PROVISION OF THE
STATUTE

As the discussion in Part II indicates, the Pennsylvania legislature did
not adopt the language of the Model Penal Code that specifically addresses
the use of offensive speech when it enacted the current disorderly conduct
statute. Nonetheless, courts have sustained convictions for the use of
offensive speech under provisions of the statute not intended to prohibit such
speech. While courts continue to cite to Mastrangelo for the principle that
the statute prohibits the use of "fighting words," the court in Mastrangelodid
not narrowly construe the statute's prohibition against "unreasonable noise"
to apply to "fighting words" as defined in post-Chaplinsky decisions. Instead,
the court simply concluded that, as applied, Mastrangelo's language
constituted fighting words. Nor is such a limiting construction found in the
Hock decision with respect to subsection (a)(1) of the statute which prohibits
"fighting or threatening."
In contrast to subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) of the statute, subsection
(a)(3) of the statute prohibiting the use of "obscene words" has been
narrowly construed in Bryner to reach only speech that meets the Miller
definition of obscenity. In so limiting subsection (a)(3), Bryner de facto
overrules Pringle. By requiring the prosecution to prove that the defendant's
words meet the Miller definition of obscenity, Bryner effectively ends the use
of subsection (a)(3) as a vehicle to punish offensive speech because it is
unlikely that the use of vulgar or disrespectful language would ever meet the
three-part Miller definition of obscenity. 266 As a result, it is likely that future

265. Id. at 949 (Castille, J., dissenting).
266. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
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offensive speech cases will continue to be prosecuted as violations of either
the "unreasonable noise" or "fighting or threatening" provisions of the
statute.
A.

UnreasonableNoise

Where a speaker is charged with offensive speech under the
"unreasonable noise" provision of the statute, a court should, consistent with
the intent of the Model Penal Code, limit its consideration to the volume of
the speech and not its content. 267 Such an approach is required by both the

Crimes Code which states that penal statutes "be construed according to the
fair import of their terms.. .-268 and the general rule of construction that

penal statutes are to be strictly construed.2 69 Applying the "unreasonable
noise" provision of the statute to punish offensive speech on the basis of

content conflicts with both the intent of the provision and the fundamental
principle of due process that requires that statutes provide fair notice of
conduct proscribed.

270

Although not in the context of offensive speech, the Superior Court, in a
number of post-Mastrangelo cases involving "unreasonable noise," has

limited its consideration to the volume and not the content of the speech in
question.

In Commonwealth v. Gilbert, for example, the defendant was

charged with making an "unreasonable noise" when he disagreed with a
police officer who intended to tow his neighbor's car.2 71 In reversing the
conviction, the court found that the defendant's speech was not "especially
loud" and did not incite the neighbors, or endanger the police.2 72 Addressing
the mens rea requirement of the statute, the court held that the
Commonwealth had failed to prove that the defendant acted with the "intent

to cause or risk a public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" as required by
the statute. 273 Instead, all the Commonwealth proved was that the officer was
annoyed by the content of defendant's speech, namely his expression of

267. Model Penal Code § 250.2, Comment p.346 (ALI 1962).
268. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 105; Commonwealth v. Williams, 579 A.2d 869, 871 (Pa. 1991) (stating that
"[w]hen interpreting a provision of the Crimes Code that contains language susceptible to
differing constructions, it is proper to consider the purpose of the particular provision
involved.").
269. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1928(b)(1); United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820)
(stating that "[tihe rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly is perhaps not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals....").
270. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (stating "[tihat the terms
of a penal statute ...must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties, is a recognized requirement,
consonant with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of law."); see United States v.
Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 92 (1975); Commonwealth v. Barud, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Aunbaugh, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (Pa. 1976).
271. 674 A.2d 284, 285 (Pa. Super. 1996).
272. Id. at 286.
273. Id.
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disagreement with the officer's intention to tow the neighbor's car.27 4 Intent,
the court concluded, cannot be inferred from the officer's annoyance with the
content of the defendant speech.275 In addition, the court found that the
defendant's speech was not "inconsistent with neighborhood tolerance or
standards" noting that the prohibition against
unreasonable noise is directed
27 6
at the volume and not the content of speech.
The court employed a similar analysis in Commonwealth v. Gowan in
which defendants were charged with making unreasonable noise while
preaching in a loud voice in a public park. 27 7 In reversing the disorderly
conduct conviction, the court noted that with respect to the defendant's
speech, there is a "wide range of subjective acceptance or rejection of the
message which colors the degree of tolerance people will have of the volume
of the delivery. ' 278 The court concluded that the treatment of the defendant's
religious speech as "unreasonable noise" in the lower court depended more
on the content of their speech and their appearance "than on the actual
noise produced. ' 279 "Mere annoyance to the public..." on the basis of
content, the court held, is insufficient to establish that the defendants made
an unreasonable noise. 2 While neither Gilbert nor Gowan involved the use
of personally offensive words, the Superior Court's analysis should be
adopted if offensive speech is prosecuted as unreasonable noise: the
provision should be construed narrowly to apply only to the volume and not
the content of the speech.
B. Fightingor Threatening
Hock is the first case to consider offensive speech under the "fighting or
threatening" provision of the statute. 281 The decision provides little guidance
to speakers and those charged with enforcing the statute. Hock limits the use
of subsection (a)(1) as a means to punish offensive speech directed at a police
officer because it rejects the notion that such speech will cause the officer to
react violently. The court's holding that Hock's speech did not constitute
disorderly conduct, however, was based on the specific facts of the case,
namely that Hock's words were said once, in a normal tone of voice to the
officer, and not in the presence of bystanders. What is not clear is what
change in the Hock facts will make speech subject to punishment as
disorderly conduct? If bystanders are present, must the prosecution establish
that the bystanders overheard the offensive remark? Is the prosecution
required to establish conduct on the part of the bystanders as the result of
overhearing the words addressed to the officer and, if so, what type of
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 287.
582 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. 1990).
Id. at 882.
Id. at 883.
Id.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1).
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conduct will cause the speaker to be subject to punishment under the statute?
If the defendant repeats the epithet without changing his tone of voice, is the
speech proscribable? Finally, Hock was decided in the context of a police
officer as addressee and offers no guidance in deciding a subsection (a)(1)
case involving offensive speech directed at a layperson.
Subsection (a)(1) of the statute uses the precise language of Section
250.2 (1)(a) of the Model Penal Code. 282 The Commentary to the Code states
that the provision was intended to reach various forms of conduct including
283
public brawling, threatening and other generic forms of violent conduct.
Nothing in the Commentary suggests that this provision was intended to
prohibit the use of "fighting words" or otherwise regulate the use of offensive
speech. Because the provision, unlike section (a)(3), has not been given a
narrowing construction, charging a speaker with "fighting or threatening"
who does no more than use offensive speech in a public setting, presents a
substantial question of whether the provision provides fair notice of what
speech constitutes disorderly conduct. In response to a challenge that as
applied to offensive speech, the "fighting or threatening" provision of the
statute is unconstitutionally vague, a court should decline to construe the
provision to prohibit "fighting words." The provision was not intended to
prohibit offensive speech and because the legislature, in declining to adopt
the language of the Model Code that specifically addresses offensive speech,
evidenced an intent not to prohibit "fighting words." 84 Moreover, a
"fighting words" construction would not apply in the case of offensive speech
addressed solely to police officers because Hock rejects the central premise
of the "fighting words" doctrine, namely that the police will act violently in
response to verbal insults. Such a construction would also not provide
guidance in determining when offensive speech, addressed in the presence of
police, constitutes disorderly conduct.
Instead of a "fighting words" construction of section (a)(1), Hock
interprets the statute as prohibiting words only where "they cause or
unjustifiably risk a public disturbance. ''1 85 The court's focus on the
circumstances surrounding the use of the offensive words for the purposes of
determining whether the words had a "direct tendency to cause acts of
violence,' 286 suggests a narrowing construction of the provision and the
statute's mens rea language based upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Brandenburgv. Ohio, the Court's modern articulation of the clear
and present danger test.2 87 In Brandenburg, the Court held that the First
282. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1); Model Penal Code § 750.2(1)(a) (both stating "engages in
fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior").
283. Model Penal Code § 250.2(1)(a), Comment p. 330-31 (1962).
284. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 711 A.2d 580, 590 (Pa. 1998); Krusza v. Maximconis, 70
A.2d 329, 331 (Pa. 1950); In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. 1998) (recognizing a
principle of statutory construction that a court may not supply omissions in a statute where it
appears that the matter may have been intentionally omitted by the legislature).
285. Hock, 728 A.2d at 946.
286. Id. (quoting Lamar v. Banks, 684 F.2d 714, 718 (11th Cir. 1982)).
287. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
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Amendment does not protect speech "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 2 The
"directed to" language in Brandenburgimplies that the speaker's purpose in
using the words in question is to produce imminent lawless action. 289 The
Brandenburgtest takes into consideration both the content of the words used
and the circumstances surrounding their use in determining the likelihood of
imminent lawless action.29° Although the clear and present danger test was
developed in the context of the risk of unlawful conduct by persons
sympathetic to the speaker's view, 29 1 the test clearly has application to
offensive speech because in both cases the concern is the commission of
unlawful acts. 29 A Brandenburg construction of subsection (a)(1) would
apply to offensive speech directed to either the police or members of the
public.
Under the proposed construction, a court initially determines whether
the offensive words were spoken with intent to provoke an immediate act of
violence by examining the circumstances in which the words were used
including the actual words spoken, how the words were expressed, the
conduct of the defendant at the time the words were spoken, and what, if
anything, the speaker said or did before using the words in question. Neither
words used to cause "public inconvenience" or "annoyance," nor words
uttered out of frustration, disappointment or exasperation, constitute
disorderly conduct under the proposed narrowing of (a)(1). Even direct
personal insults would not constitute disorderly conduct if the speaker did
not use the words to provoke violence. When the required intent is
established, the use of offensive speech would constitute disorderly conduct
only if it was established that, in light of all the circumstances, it was likely
that violence was imminent. Under this prong of the proposed construction,
where offensive speech is addressed to a police officer, the focus, in light of
Hock, would be solely on the imminence of violence on the part of
bystanders who overheard the speech in question. When such speech is
addressed to a member of the public, the speech would constitute disorderly
conduct only if the words were likely to cause the person addressed or others
who overheard the remarks to make an immediate violent response.
While such a construction of subsection (a)(1) may result in some
offensive speech not being punished that would arguably constitute

288. Brandenberg, 395 U.S. at 447.
289. See Greenwalt, supra n. 42 at 207.
290. Franklyn S. Haidman, Speech & Law in a Free Society, 276 (The U. Of Chi. Press 1981);
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment, 70 Calif. L. Rev.
1159, 1185 (1982).
291. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
292. See Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 Colum.L.Rev. 1527, 1549
(1993); Lawrence H. Tribe, The American Constitutional Law § 12-8, at 838 (discussing
relationship between offensive speech and the clear and present danger test).
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disorderly conduct under a "fighting words" construction of the provision,2 93
the proposed construction provides a constitutional basis to punish offensive
speech that does not meet the Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky definition of
"fighting words." As an example, offensive speech not addressed in a faceto-face manner would constitute disorderly conduct under the construction if
the words were spoken with the intent to provoke violence and there was a
likelihood of imminent violence by someone who heard the words in
question. Or, in the case of offensive speech directed to a police officer, the
speech would constitute disorderly conduct even though the officer is trained
not to react violently if the words were likely to incite immediate violent acts
on the part of third parties present when the words were spoken. In addition,
in light of Hock, the proposed construction would obviate the need for
separate constructions of (a)(1) depending on whether the addressee is a
police officer or a member of the public. Finally, because the focus of the
proposed construction is the actual likelihood of imminent violence brought
about by the use of offensive speech, it is consistent with what the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often stated is the "cardinal feature of the
crime of disorderly conduct," namely "public unruliness which can or does
lead to tumult or disorder. '294
CONCLUSION
Shortly after the enactment of the disorderly conduct statute, various
members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court questioned whether the
enforcement of the statute infringed upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights. 295 Their specific concern was that the statute failed to provide fair
notice of what speech was prohibited and, as a result, both the public and the
police were left to "guess" as to the meaning of the statute. The same
concern remains today. Although Pennsylvania courts have decided a
number of cases involving the public use of vulgar or insulting language
under the disorderly conduct statute, courts have not addressed the
vagueness and overbreadth of the statute by providing a narrowing
construction consistent with decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
Uncertainty about the meaning of the statute has resulted in the
prosecution of some speakers for the use of offensive language under the
statute generally 296 or as a violation of the statute's prohibition against the
making of an "unreasonable noise." Others were being charged with using
293. See supra n. 90 (and accompanying text) (noting there is disagreement among
commentators over whether post-Chaplinsky decisions changed the focus of a "fighting words"
inquiry from the average addressee to the actual addressee. If the standard remains an objective
one, assuming a properly narrowed statute, offensive words may be punished as "fighting words"
without determining whether violence on the part of the actual addressee was, in fact, imminent.
This is precisely the determination that must be made under a Brandenburgconstruction of the
statute).
294. Commonwealth v. Greene, 189 A.2d 141,144 (Pa. 1963).
295. E.g. Hock, 728 A.2d at 947 n. 4.
296. Model Penal Code § 250.2 (1962).
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"obscene language," or engaging in "fighting or threatening" behavior.
While the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Hock, the court's most recent case
involving offensive speech, rejected reflexive violence on the part of police
officers as a basis upon which to punish the use of such speech, the decision,
like earlier decisions, does not address the statute's failure to provide fair
notice to speakers of what language is prohibited.
In light of recent post-Pringle decisions by the Superior Court limiting
the "obscene language" provision of the statute to speech that meets the
definition of obscenity in Miller v. California, it is likely that future offensive
speech cases will come to the courts under the "unreasonable noise" or
"fighting or threatening" provisions of the statute, both provisions adopt,
verbatim, the Model Penal Code. Based upon the Comments to the Model
Penal Code, the "unreasonable noise" provision should be limited solely to a
consideration of the volume and not the content of the speech in question.
Limiting the "unreasonable noise" provision in this manner and assuming
courts will continue to construe the "obscene language" provision to reach
only that category of offensive speech that appeals to the prurient interest,
will, in time, result in offensive speech in the form of personally insulting
words being charged only under the "fighting and threatening" provision of
the statute. To constitutionally apply the "fighting or threatening" provision
of the statute to offensive speech, a court must narrowly limit the statute.
While the provision could be construed to reach only speech that meets the
United States Supreme Court's post-Chaplinsky definition of "fighting
words," the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Hock rejecting
"fighting words" as a basis to punish offensive speech directed to a police
officer suggests a construction in which offensive speech would constitute
disorderly conduct only where the speaker used the words with the intent to
provoke an immediate act of violence, and under circumstances in which the
words "were likely to incite or produce" violent action. Such a narrowing
construction would provide speakers with fair notice of the speech proscribed
by the statute and finally resolve the constitutional concerns about the statute
first raised more than twenty-five years ago.

